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Text of the Interview with
Computer Programmer Clint Curtis, before the
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Democrats of the Judiciary Committee,
December 13, 2004.
Transcribed by this author, December, 2004.
See the Video
Cliff Arnebeck called Clint Curtis before the Committee, for the purpose of determining if the vote-counting process of the 2004 U.S. General Election in Ohio could have been manipulated by computer.
~~~ (begin interview) ~~~
[Mr. Curtis is sworn in by the court reporter, on-camera, but without sound. Then sound commences.]
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
Mr. Curtis, would you please state your full name for the record.
[Mr. Curtis:]
My name is Clinton Eugene Curtis.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
And where do you reside?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Tallahassee, Florida.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
And what is your profession?
[Mr. Curtis:]
I'm a computer programmer.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
Would you please speak into the microphone so that the audience can hear your testimony.
[Mr. Curtis:]
I'm a computer programmer.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
Mr Curtis, are there programs that can be used to secretly fix elections?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
How do you know that to be the case?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Because in October of 2000 I wrote a prototype for present Congressman Tom Feeney, at the company I work for in Oviedo, Florida, that did just that.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
And when you say, "Did just that," it would rig an election?
[Mr. Curtis:]
It would flip the vote fifty-one forty-nine to whoever you wanted it to go to, and whichever race you wanted it to win.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
And would that program that you designed be something that elections officials, that might be on county boards of elections, could detect?
[Mr. Curtis:]
They'd never see it.
[Audience: "Hmmm!"]
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
Mr....[Audience speaks "... question again"] Would you answer that question once again?
[Mr. Curtis:]
They would never see it.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
So how would such a program, a secret program that fixes the election, how could it be detected?
[Mr. Curtis:]
You would have to view it either in the source code, or you'd have to have a receipt, and then count the hard paper against the actual vote total. Other than that, you won't see it.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
Alright, Mr. Curtis, if you had been asked, you or others with your professional expertise, had been asked to design a protective program, a program that would protect the Ohio elections from against such software to fix the election, could you have done so?
[Mr. Curtis:]
If we'd been asked to make a program that could fix the election? Sure, anybody can do it.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
No, could you have designed a program, a procedure, a protocol, that would have protected Ohio against this kind of rigging?
[Mr. Curtis:]
No, you have to look at the source code. You have to get, probably, programmers from both, or all, parties to look at the source code, and determine if there's anything in there that shouldn't be there. I mean, it's a simple program, you're adding one, two persons total. It's a hundreds lines of code, tops. There's.. [unintelligible]
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
Are you aware of whether there was any protective action in Ohio against this kind of vote rigging through software?
[Mr. Curtis:]
I don't know.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
You don't know?
[Mr. Curtis:]
I don't know.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
You were not asked to assist in the development of any protective system, is that correct?
[Mr. Curtis:]
No I was not.
In your op.. uh..have you reviewed at all the elections results in Ohio?
[Mr. Curtis:]
No I haven't.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
OK. Given the availability of such vote-rigging software, and the testimony that has been given under oath of substantial statistical anomalies, and gross differences between
exit polling data and the actual tabulated results, do you have an opinion whether or not the Ohio election, the Presidential election, was hacked?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes I would say it was. I mean, if you ... have exit polling data that is significantly off from the vote, then it's probably hacked.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
And your testimony is under oath?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes, sir.
[Cliff Arnebeck:]
And the testimony you've given is true?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes, sir.
Thank you.
[Applause, considerable.]
[Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones:]
Congresswoman Waters and I have the same question:
[Curtis is directed: "Back to the podium." Curtis returns to podium.]
[Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones:]
What did you say you were asked to prepare?
[Mr. Curtis:]
I was asked by Tom Feeney, he's now Congressman, at that time he was
Speaker of the House of Florida;
Yang Enterprises' --- which is the company I worked for --- lobbyist; and
their corporate attorney. He wore a lotta hats.
[Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones:]
And at that time, he was the Speaker of the House of Florida, is that what you said?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes.
[Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones:]
Ok, thank you.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
You say he was the lobbyist for the voting machine company at the same time he was Speaker of the House?
[Mr. Curtis:]
I don't know what the voting machine company, but he was a lobbyist for Yang Enterprises. We had NASA contracts...
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Yang Enterprises did what, computers?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Computers.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
OK. And he was your lobbyist, your company's lobbyist?
[Mr. Curtis:]
He was the lobbyist for Yang Enterprises.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
And he asked you to design a code to rig an election?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
While he was Speaker of the Florida House?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Was that during, or previous to, the 2000 election?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes, October, end of September.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Did he ever express why he wanted the code to rig an election?
[Mr. Curtis:]
No. I immediately assumed that they were trying to keep you guys from cheating on them. [Audience laughs.] So I wrote up the documentation of what you would look for in the source code, how you would make sure that you didn't get, you know, taken advantage of, make sure that all voting machines had receipts, because that way you could back count the ones that looked funny.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
By "receipts," you mean a paper trail?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes, paper trail. And I handed that in to Mrs. Yang and said, "Here's your report, here's your program."
And she said, "You don't understand. We need to hide the fraud in the source, in the source code."
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Hide the fraud, not reveal it?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Not reveal the fraud, "Because we need it to control the vote in South Florida." That's what she it said.
[Audience: "Woh!!"]
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
To your knowledge, was this used?
[Mr. Curtis:]
I have no idea, I, I was ready to leave. [Audience/Curtis laugh.] I retired and left the company.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Your testimony just a moment ago I think you said just before you left in answer to Congresswoman ... Jones' question, would you just repeat what you said in reference to the
exit polls?
[Mr. Curtis:]
The exit polls should not be significantly different from the vote.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
And if they were, you would conclude what?
[Mr. Curtis:]
I would conclude someone's playing with the vote.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Not with the exit polls?
[Mr. Curtis:]
That's possible too.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
OK.
[Mr. Curtis:]
Something is definitely skewed.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Something is skewed in one or the other?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Right. To select which one, you'd have to see where the problem is.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Let me ask you one further question. Assuming for the moment that such software, that's what you call it? such software to rig a vote, was used, in one or more machines in Ohio or in Florida, could you today detect that, if you looked at the source code?
[Mr. Curtis:]
If you could get the machines, and they had not been patched yet, I mean once they get in and touch 'em, anything could happen. You could also set timers to do that, but then you'd see the timers. Then you'd have to take those machines, decompile 'em, which I couldn't do, but possibly a Microsoft or MIT something, could do, you might, you might, be able to do.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
You might.
[Mr. Curtis:]
Depends on how good they are at destroying what they had.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Destroying what they had by tampering with the machine afterwards, or by programming it with
destroying instruction in the first place?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Right.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Either or both?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Either or both. Because since you didn't actually see what's in there. So you don't actually know if the code is running in single executable, or running in various modules. If it's running in modules, you can make the code actually eat itself.
[Audience murmurs, then "Wow!"]
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Let me ask you just one further question. We've been told, I've been told, that people who assume that lots of the election results, a large fraction of the election results in this state may have been affected by computerware fraud in the computer are paranoid, because in order to do that you would have to have access to thousands of machines, and that would be readily detectable. Is that true?
[Mr. Curtis:]
It depends on the technology used. If you did a central tabulation machine that fed in, all you would have to do is set a flag. If you set a flag, the central tabulation machine would then flip your vote.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
So if you, so one person putting in bad code in a central tabulation machine could affect thousands and thousands, or tens of thousands, of votes?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Right. And you could activate it ...
[Congressman Nadler starts to speak, but stops]
[Mr. Curtis:]
...you could activate it either automatically, or you could make it so that there's code existing on like an automic [?] machine that feeds it, where you would punch it in, it would set the flag, server would receive the flag, and then...
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
And if you had a recount ... [unclear] ... no paper trail --- assuming that would happen --- would that be revealable by seeing a discrepancy between what the tabulator, the central tabulator trail [unclear] the individual machines which had not been tampered with, have?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Not if I wrote it.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Why not?
[Mr. Curtis:]
I would make it match.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
You could work back from the tabulator to the individual machines? So the tabulator would tell the machines to switch their results?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes. It talks both ways. You can flip it to do whatever you need.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
And they actually do talk to each other, the machines...?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Yes, once it's hooked up, if it's networked together, they can talk to each other.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
So there's absolutely no assurance whatsoever that anything could be [right?] with these machines?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Absolutely none, unless you look at the source code, and make sure it's safe before it goes out.
[Congressman Jerrold Nadler:]
Thank you very much.
[Madam Chair:]
Thank you, Congressman Nadler. I know that Congresswoman Waters has questions, and then Senator Miller, and then Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs-Jones.
[Congresswoman Maxine Waters:]
This will only a moment, if you will come back to the uh, microphone.
[Audience laughs]
[Curtis: ]
I'm new at this.
[Congresswoman Maxine Waters:]
As you know, there has been a lot of discussion about, I think it was Diebold Company, their relationship to the President, and the administration, and supposedly comments about helping to insure that the President was re-elected. In your world, in your environment, have you heard any of this kind of discussion? Do you know people at Diebold? Do you have any sense of any actions that may have been taken?
[Mr. Curtis:]
Uh, I don't know anything about that at all.
[Congresswoman Maxine Waters:]
Thank you.
[Madam Chair calls Dr. Miller]
[Dr. Miller:]
I suspect that people will attack you in terms of your credibility. Could you restate once again your, your credentials.
[Mr. Curtis:]
Uh, I'm a programmer, I worked for NASA, I worked for Exxon Mobil, I worked for um, Florida Department of Transportation, and other elements of my story, because this company, well, let's get into it. Why not? This company also had a NASA contract, and they were basically downloading tons of information, I mean, gigabytes' worth, and handing them off to this little Chinese guy named Henry Nee (?) And, it didn't seem right, and, he was hacking things
I wrote a program for DOT that allowed contractors to send information into DOT, and he was kind of the quality assurance guy for software. He put a wiretapping module into the program that went out to the contractors so that it actually sent everything they sent, back to Yang. So I reported all this, and just last March I think, he was arrested for attempting to send anti-tank missile chips to the capital of Communist China.
If that's correct, this is like a small thing...
Of course I think he only got a hundred dollar fine.
[Audience: Hmmmm! Hmmm!]
And no time.
[Audience: Oh God!]
[Madam Chair:]
Thank you. Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs-Jones....
[Audience: long, hearty applause]
We are now going to um go back to the public testimony and...
[End]
Air America Radio interviewed Mr. Curtis on December 8, 2004, after his sworn affidavit was made public, but before his sworn testimony before the House Committee. The Air America Radio interviews can be heard here:
http://movies.ziaspace.com/curtispt1.mp3
http://movies.ziaspace.com/curtispt2.mp3
http://movies.ziaspace.com/curtispt1.mp3.filepart
Click here to see and hear the interview online thru Brad Blog (Only the REAL PLAYER is available - KS, 8/05)
Click here for Brad Blog's compendium of news sources on Clint Curtis's interview
Click here for Mr. Curtis's sworn and notarized affidavit, dated Dec. 6, 2004, thru Brad Blog
Excerpts from the sworn affidavit:
"In the vote fraud prototype that I created things were not what they seemed. Hidden on the screen were invisible buttons. A person with knowledge of the locations of those invisible buttons could then use them to alter the votes of any candidate listed. By clicking the correct order of invisible buttons the candidate selected by the user is compared to other candidates within that same race. If the candidate they selected is leading the race, nothing happens. If the other candidate is leading the race, the vote totals are altered so that the selected candidate is now leading the race with 51% of the vote. The other candidates then share the remaining 49% in exact proportion to the totals they had previously."
"The IG at the FDOT [Florida Department of Transportation], Raymond Lemme, pursued some of the allegations I made against YEI [Yang Enterprises], as I had advised him of the information concerning Tom Feeney and the vote fraud issue, illegal aliens employed by YEI, fallacious over-billing, and a wiretapping module that was placed into a FDOT software program for the document management system. Mr. Lemme continued to meet and talk with me about matters relating to the case after I was fired from FDOT, and in June of 2003, he told me that he had tracked the corruption 'all the way to the top,' and that the story would break in the next few weeks and I would be satisfied with the results. A few weeks later, on July 1st, Mr. Lemme was found dead with his arm slashed in a hotel room in Valdosta, Georgia."
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News
Breaking News from Bev Harris; current
Kerry/Edwards could still seize the Whitehouse, Dec. 2, 2004
Recount Efforts in the U.S., Kim Zetter at Wired News, thru Nov, 2004
E-Voting News at VerifiedVoting.org, thru Nov, 2004
Latest on the Ohio Re-Count, by Keith Olbermann, MSNBC, Nov. 23, 2004
Berkeley CA statistical analysis of Florida data, Nov. 18, 2004
Recount in Ohio,
Nov. 15, 2004
California collects $2.6 million in Diebold suit for faulty voting machines, Nov 11, 2004
BBC says NBC exec calls exit polls "junk," Nov. 4, 2004
Kerry Won in Ohio, by Greg Palast, TomPaine.com, Nov. 4, 2004
Myriad errors in OH & PA Voting Process, Nov. 3, 2004
California investigates Diebold, Dec. 17, 2003
Will the Election be Stolen? Sept 29, 2003
Seattle Times discusses Bev Harris's findings, Sept 25, 2003
Definitions
assigned votes: the final numbers of votes, as declared by the authorities who count them; the counterpart to assigned votes is projected votes, which are the numbers of votes accumulated through exit polls
Australian ballots: another name for paper ballots in the U.S., system developed in Australia in mid-1800's
balanced: a voting precinct is balanced when the number of voters' signatures (on poll tapes) matches the number of ballots after that precinct's polls close; many, many precincts are not balanced at first, but are brought into balance later as the reasons for the discrepancies are found out
ballot: comes from the same word as "ball"; voting in ancient times was determined by secretly placing a tiny black or white ball into a container; today, ballots are of many types: optical scan, punch card, data punch, and paper; ballotless voting is done by electronic (touch-screen) machines and the older, lever machines that count like a car's odometer; by far the largest form of ballot in use in the US in 2004 is the optical scan ballot ("OS") ballot system
central tabulating software: ballot-counting software installed on a computer at the vote-counting headquarters, usually at county level;it is possible that this vote-tabulating function can be accessed by any computer in the world, and that to do so is not at all complicated, however, an investigation is necessary to learn the extent to which this is possible
central tabulating office: ballot-counting is done here, usually at the Registrar of Voters of any given county (US); a county will be divided into regions called "precincts," which have a voting place centrally located; votes made at the precinct polling place are counted either at the precinct, then sent to the central tabulating office, or sent directly to the central tabulating office where all votes/ballots are counted ("tabulated")
chad: the pieces of paper left in the holes that are supposed to get punched completely out in votomatic and other punch-card voting machines; recent discussion has delineated several specific types of chads, such as "hanging chad," "pregnant chad," and the like, giving much cause for election-time mirth
Ciber Labs: the Huntsville, Alabama branch of an ITA that was supposed to, but didn't, test Diebold GEMS central tabulator software for penetration, according to Bev Harris
computer voting system: a blurry, general category that, in the public eye, includes paperless touchscreen systems, as well as any system where voting results are tabulated by computer at a centralized location, which of course includes almost the entire U.S. voting process; much clarification needs to be done between computer knowledgeable people and their less-informed counterparts across the nation, to inform ourselves more clearly on what is being sent by what segments of the Internet; the primary necessity is to create a U.S. system where a recount can occur as accurately, precisely, and efficiently as it does in European and other democracies; only when a recount is feasible can the voting process be depended upon to be fair
data punch: "voters punch holes in the cards (with a supplied punch device) opposite their candidate or ballot issue choice. After voting, the voter may place the ballot in a ballot box, or the ballot may be fed into a computer vote-tabulating device at the precinct."
Diebold: second largest vendor of voting machines for the 2004 Election; owner, Mr. O'Dell, said publicly that he will help to get Ohio's votes to go for Bush; the company has given nearly $200,000 to the Republican party
DRE: a ballotless system known as "Direct Recording Electronic" voting system, also called "Touch Screen"
electronic voting system: Ballotless voting system, also known as Direct Recording Electronic (DRE); used statewide or nearly so in Georgia (Diebold), Kentucky, Tennessee, Nevada, New Mexico, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey; used extensively in several other states (see map, above)
ES&S: Election Systems and Software, one of the biggest manufacturers of computerized voting systems; 56% of US votes in November 2, 2004's General Election were cast on ES&S machines; formerly named American Information Systems, Inc.
exit poll: a survey taken after voters have voted and exited the polling place, by asking voters who they voted for; this gives a very close approximation of how the real vote is going; historically, exit polls in the U.S. have been very accurate, differing from final tabulations, at the most, by 1/10th of 1 percent.
FEC: Federal Election Commission; in 1984 they produced Voting System Standards: A Report on the Feasibility of Developing Voluntary Standards for Voting Equipment
GEMS: Global Election Management System, the Windows-based software at the heart of the Diebold voting machines
IEEE: "The IEEE and its predecessors, the AIEE (American Institute of Electrical Engineers) and the IRE (Institute of Radio Engineers), date to 1884."
ITA: Independent Testing Authority, the categorical name for companies hired by NASED to test the computer-driven voting systems now in use in the U.S.
lever machines: Ballotless voting system operated by pulling a lever to add one's vote to a tally; a series of levers and resulting tallies operate like odometers, moving up 1/10th of a rotation with each vote; now used in New York, Virginia and Louisiana primarily; these machines are no longer made
Mark-sense or Marksense: Voting system where dark marks are made on a paper ballot, then scanned by various types of machinery; also known as "Optical Scan" or OS, as opposed to the earlier (pre-1960's) electronic sensing systems that read the conductivity of pencil marks; optical systems read the shade (lightness/darkness) of the mark, not its electrical properties
NASED: National Association of State Election Directors, with the Secretariat of this group being in Texas; they are supposed to certify that your election voting system is "safe" and free from tamperability (Note: their new website has only one contact person, whose city and state are not given; see Bev Harris's website , p. 5, for a list of NASED officials; the Secretariat is/was R. Doug Lewis in Houston, TX electioncent@pdq.net)
optical scan:, a voting system where ballots are marked by the voter, then put through a scanning machine that reads the marks; the most widely-used type of US voting system; also known as "Marksense" (see above)
OS: Optical Scan (see above)
paper ballots: forms printed on paper or cardstock listing candidates names, and election choices, and including places to mark one's choice; known as Australian ballots, because the system was perfected there first; are filled out in privacy and put into a sealed ballot box; counted by hand; undoubtedly the best, some say the only, system for insuring accurate counting of ballots
paper trail: = ballots! If voters cast paper ballots, these can always be recounted, thus keeping the election honest. When voters use computerized voting machines, there's no proof that what the voter chose is what got counted (even if the voter gets a paper record, that will not help, since it would be impossible to collect all these papers from voters and recount them)
PBHC: Paper Ballot Hand Counted, the voting system in the U.S. where voters mark ballots that have the information printed right on the ballot itself, and then these ballots are counted by hand, that it, people tally them personally --- also called the Australian Ballot system, as it was first perfected in that country (in 1856!).
polling place: or "polls," the place where people go to vote; the voting place; in the US, these are often in schools and other official, easily-accessible locations;not to be confused with the other meaning, i.e., surveys taken, asking a series of people the same questions
polls: (1) surveys taken by asking people certain choices, for the purpose of finding out the generally-held views of a group of people; (2) the place where people go to vote; the voting place; in the US, these are often in schools and other official, easily-accessible locations
poll tapes: the record that contains the original voters' signatures; these are compared to the actual number of ballots cast in that precinct; if the number of signatures matches the number of ballots, the precinct is said to be "balanced" (q.v.)
precinct: the local voting region; there are several precincts in each county; people living in one precinct will all vote at that precinct's polling place; votes can be counted in the precincts, with those totals being given to the county office; or the voted ballots can be delivered to the central county location where all votes are counted together; the county election officials then report to the Secretary of State of their state
projected totals: the numbers of votes accumulated through exit polls, which figures are used to create media projections of how the final count will turn out (see Exit Polls)
public commons: the rightful gathering places of the public; the entire vote-counting process is supposed to take place here, in full view of members of the public, and never be hidden from public view, as it is today with computerized counting machines of all kinds, which system is causing increasing secrecy of the vote-counting process away from public accessibility
RAS: Remote Access Server, a type of phone-number-accessed server, run on Windows, which is very easy for computer folks to enter; the centralized vote counting programs used in the November 2 Presidential Election were linked through RAS systems, meaning that anyone, anywhere in the world, could get in, change vote counts, and leave without much of a trace, according to Bev Harris
Secretary of State: An office at both the Federal and State levels; at State level, this is an elected position, but quizzically, this official's responsibility is to oversee all major elections
server: a computer that "serves" to link many computers together, forming the "Internet"; a server is any normal small computer, like yours or mine, that has "server software" operating on it; the huge net of servers forms the Internet; you can "see" the Internet connecting you to a distant website --- go to Start, Run, type in cmd, hit OK, then in the black window, type tracert, then a space, then the domain name of the website you want to see the path to (e.g., www.craigslist.org); hit "Enter"
tabulation: the county-level activity of counting all the votes in the county; this counting is done, in most cases in the US, by a normal-looking computer that has special tabulation software installed; each county has one, or sometimes two, such computers functioning on Election Day and for some time thereafter; each computer can process up to 2,000,000 votes at a time; often, today's voting machines are connected via the Internet, directly to the tabulation computer
TS: Touch Screen, a ballotless voting system where the voter touches the computer screen to select his/her choice; a type of DRE system
Voting Systems Panel (VSP): group at State level (California, 2003) to inquire into the nature of current voting systems
Votomatic: punch card voting system that has nothing except numbers printed on the ballot cards; one punches the card at the numbers that correspond to the choices on a separate display
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